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Abstract. This article brings attention to some historical developments that
gave rise to the Bayes factor for testing a point null hypothesis against
a composite alternative. In line with current thinking, we find that the
conceptual innovation —to assign prior mass to a general law— is due
to a series of three articles by Dorothy Wrinch and Sir Harold Jeffreys
(1919, 1921, 1923). However, our historical investigation also suggests
that in 1932 J. B. S. Haldane made an important contribution to the
development of the Bayes factor by proposing the use of a mixture prior
comprising a point mass and a continuous probability density. Jeffreys
was aware of Haldane’s work and it may have inspired him to pursue a
more concrete statistical implementation for his conceptual ideas. It thus
appears that Haldane may have played a much bigger role in the statistical
development of the Bayes factor than has hitherto been assumed.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Bayes factors grade the evidence that the data provide for one statistical model
over another. As such, they represent “the primary tool used in Bayesian inference
for hypothesis testing and model selection” (Berger, 2006, p. 378). In addition,
Bayes factors can be used for model-averaging (Hoeting et al., 1999) and variable
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2 ETZ AND WAGENMAKERS
selection (Bayarri et al., 2012). Bayes factors are employed across widely different
disciplines such as astrophysics (Lattimer and Steiner, 2014), forensics (Taroni
et al., 2014), psychology (Dienes, 2014), economics (Malikov et al., 2015) and
ecology (Cuthill and Charleston, in press). Moreover, Bayes factors are a topic
of active statistical interest (e.g., Fouskakis et al., 2015; Holmes et al., 2015;
Sparks et al., 2015; for a more pessimistic view see Robert, 2016). These modern
applications and developments arguably find their roots in the work of one man:
Sir Harold Jeffreys.
Jeffreys is a towering figure in the history of Bayesian statistics. His early
writings, together with his co-author Dorothy Wrinch (Wrinch and Jeffreys, 1919,
1921, 1923a), championed the use of probability theory as a means of induction
and laid the conceptual groundwork for the development of the Bayes factor.
The insights from this work culminated in the monograph Scientific Inference
(Jeffreys, 1931), in which Jeffreys gives thorough treatment to how a scientist
can use the laws of inverse probability (now known as Bayesian inference) to
“learn from experience” (for a review see Howie, 2002 and an earlier version of
this paper available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1511.08180v2).
Among many other notable accomplishments, such as the development of prior
distributions that are invariant under transformation and his work in geophysics
and astronomy, where he discovered that the Earth’s core is liquid, Jeffreys is
widely recognized as the inventor of the Bayesian significance test, with seminal
papers in 1935 and 1936 (Jeffreys, 1935, 1936a). The centerpiece of these papers is
a number, which Jeffreys denotes K, that indicates the ratio of posterior to prior
odds; much later, Jeffreys’s statistical tests would come to be known as Bayes
factors (Good, 1958).1 Once again these works culminated in a comprehensive
book, Theory of Probability (Jeffreys, 1939).
When the hypotheses in question are simple point hypotheses, the Bayes factor
reduces to a likelihood ratio, a method of measuring evidential strength which
dates back as far as Johann Lambert in 1760 (Lambert and DiLaura, 2001) and
Daniel Bernoulli in 1777 (Kendall et al., 1961; see Edwards, 1974 for a historical
review); C. S. Peirce had specifically called it a measure of ‘weight of evidence’
as far back as 1878 (Peirce, 1878; see Good, 1979). Alan Turing also indepen-
dently developed likelihood ratio tests using Bayes’ theorem, deriving decibans
to describe the intensity of the evidence, but this approach was again based on
the comparison of simple versus simple hypotheses; for example, Turing used
decibans when decrypting the Enigma codes to infer the identity of a given letter
in German military communications during World War II (Turing, 1941/2012).2
1See Good (1988) and Fienberg (2006) for a historical review. The term ‘Bayes factor’ comes
from Good, who attributes the introduction of the term to Turing, who simply called it the
‘factor.’
2Turing started his Maths Tripos at King’s College in 1931, graduated BA in 1934, and
was a Fellow of King’s College from 1935-1936. Anthony (A. W. F.) Edwards speculates that
Turing might have attended some of Jeffreys’s lectures while at Cambridge, where he would have
learned about details of Bayes’ theorem (Edwards, 2015, personal communication). According
to the college’s official record of lecture lists, Jeffreys’s lectures ’Probability’ started in 1935 (or
possibly Easter Term 1936), and in the year 1936 they were in the Michaelmas (i.e., Fall) Term.
Turing would have had the opportunity of attending them in the Easter Term or the Michaelmas
Term in 1936 (Edwards, 2015, personal communication). Jack (I. J.) Good has also provided
speculation about their potential connection, “Turing and Jeffreys were both Cambridge dons,
so perhaps Turing had seen Jeffreys’s use of Bayes factors; but, if he had, the effect on him
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As Good (1979) notes, Jeffreys’s Bayes factor approach to testing hypotheses “is
especially ‘Bayesian’ [because] either [hypothesis] is composite” (p. 393).
Jeffreys states that across his career his “chief interest is in significance tests”
(Jeffreys, 1980, p. 452). Moreover, in an (unpublished) interview with Dennis
Lindley (DVL) for the Royal Statistical Society on August 25, 1983, when asked
“What do you see as your major contribution to probability and statistics?”
Jeffreys (HJ) replies,
HJ: The idea of a significance test, I suppose, putting half the probability into a
constant being 0, and distributing the other half over a range of possible values.
DVL: And that’s a very early idea in your work.
HJ: Well, I came on to it gradually. It was certainly before the first edition of ‘Theory
of Probability’.
DVL: Well, of course, it is related to those ideas you were talking about to us a few
minutes ago, with Dorothy Wrinch, where you were putting a probability on. . .
HJ: Yes, it was there, of course, when the data are counts. It went right back to the
beginning.
(“Transcription of a Conversation between Sir Harold Jeffreys and Professor D.V.
Lindley”, Exhibit A25, St John’s College Library, Papers of Sir Harold Jeffreys)
That Jeffreys considers his greatest contribution to statistics to be the devel-
opment of Bayesian significance tests, tests that compare a point null against a
distributed (i.e, composite) alternative, is remarkable considering the range of his
accomplishments.
In their influential introductory paper on Bayes factors, Kass and Raftery
(1995) state,
In a 1935 paper and in his book Theory of Probability, Jeffreys developed a method-
ology for quantifying the evidence in favor of a scientific theory. The centerpiece
was a number, now called the Bayes factor, which is the posterior odds of the null
hypothesis when the prior probability on the null is one-half. (p. 773, abstract)
Many distinguished statisticians and historians of statistics consider the devel-
opment of the Bayes factor to be one of Jeffreys’s greatest achievements and a
landmark contribution to the foundation of Bayesian statistics. In a recent dis-
cussion of Jeffreys’s contribution to Bayesian inference, Robert et al. (2009) recall
the importance and novelty of Jeffreys’s significance tests,
If the hypothesis to be tested is H0 : θ = 0, against the alternative H1 that is the
aggregate of other possible values [of θ], Jeffreys initiates one of the major advances
of Theory of Probability by rewriting the prior distribution as a mixture of a point
mass in θ = 0 and of a generic density pi on the range of θ. . . This is indeed a
stepping stone for Bayesian Statistics in that it explicitly recognizes the need to
separate the null hypothesis from the alternative hypothesis within the prior, lest
the null hypothesis is not properly weighted once it is accepted. (p. 157) [emphasis
original]
Some commentators on Robert et al. (2009) shared their sentiment. Lindley
(2009) remarked that Jeffreys’s “triumph was a general method for the construc-
tion of significance tests, putting a concentration of prior probability on the null
must have been unconscious for he never mentioned this influence and he was an honest man.
He had plenty of time to tell me the influence if he was aware of it, for I was his main statistical
assistant for a year” (Good, 1980, p. 26). Later, in an interview with David Banks, Good
remarks that “Turing might have seen [Wrinch and Jeffreys’s] work, but probably he thought
of [his likelihood ratio tests] independently” (Banks, 1996, p. 11). Of course, Turing could have
learned about Bayes’ theorem from any of the standard probability books at the time, such as
Todhunter (1858), but the potential connection is of interest. For more detail on Turing’s work
on cryptanalysis see Zabell (2012).
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value. . . and evaluating the posterior probability using what we now call Bayes
factors” (p. 184). Kass (2009) noted that a “striking high-level feature of Theory
of Probability is its championing of posterior probabilities of hypotheses (Bayes
factors), which made a huge contribution to epistemology” (p. 180). Moreover,
Senn (2009) is similarly impressed with Jeffreys’s innovation in assigning a con-
centration of probability to the null hypothesis, calling it “a touch of genius,
necessary to rescue the Laplacian formulation [of induction]” (p. 186).3
In discussions of the development of the Bayes factor, as above, most authors
focus on the work of Jeffreys, with some mentioning the early related work by
Turing and Good. A piece of history that is missing from these discussions and
commentaries is the contribution of John Burdon Sanderson (J. B. S.) Haldane,
whose application of these ideas potentially spurred Jeffreys into making his con-
ceptual ideas about scientific learning more concrete—in the form of the Bayes
factor.4 In a paper entitled “The Bayesian Controversy in Statistical Inference”,
after discussing some of Jeffreys’s early Bayesian developments, Barnard (1967)
briefly remarks,
Another man whose views were closely related to Jeffreys was Haldane, who. . . proposed
a prior having a lump of probability at the null hypothesis with the rest spread out,
in connexion [sic] with tests of significance. (p. 238)
Similarly, the Biographical Memoirs of the Fellows of the Royal Society includes
an entry for Haldane (Pirie, 1966), in which M. S. Bartlett recalls,
In statistics, [Haldane] combined an objective approach to populations with an oc-
casional cautious use of inverse probability methods, the latter being apparently
envisaged in frequency terms ... [Haldane’s] idea of a concentration of a prior distri-
bution at a particular value was later adopted by Harold Jeffreys, F.R.S. as a basis
for a theory of significance tests. (p. 233)
However, we have not seen Haldane’s connection to the Bayes factor hypothesis
test mentioned in the modern statistics literature, and we are not aware of any
in-depth accounts of this particular innovation to date.
Haldane is perhaps best known in the statistics literature by his proposal of a
prior distribution suited for estimation of the rate of rare events, which has be-
come known as Haldane’s prior (Haldane, 1932, 1948).5 References to Haldane’s
1932 paper focus mainly on its proposal of the Haldane prior, and they largely
miss his formulation of a mixture prior comprising a point mass and a smoothly
distributed alternative—a crucial component in the Bayes factor hypothesis tests
that Jeffreys would later develop. Among Haldane’s various biographies (e.g.,
Clark, 1968; Crow, 1992; Lai, 1998; Sarkar, 1992) there is no mention of this
development; while they sometimes mention statistics and mathematics among
his broad list of interests, they understandably tend to focus on his major ad-
vances made in biology and genetics. In fact, this result is not mentioned even in
Haldane’s own autobiographical account of his career accomplishments (Haldane,
1966).
3However, see Senn’s recent in-depth discussion at http://tinyurl.com/ow4lahd for a less
enthusiastic perspective.
4Howie (2002, p. 125) gives a brief account of some ways Haldane might have influenced
Jeffreys’s thoughts, but does not draw this connection.
5Interestingly, Haldane’s prior appears to be an instance of Stigler’s law of eponymy, since
Jeffreys derived it in his book Scientific Inference (Jeffreys, 1931, p. 194) eight months before
Haldane’s publication.
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The primary purpose of this paper is to review the work of Haldane and discuss
how it may have spurred Jeffreys into developing his highly influential Bayesian
significance tests. We begin by reviewing the developments made by Haldane in
his 1932 paper, followed by a review of Jeffreys’s earliest work on the topic. We go
on to draw parallels between their respective works and speculate on the nature
of the connection between the two men.
2. HALDANE’S CONTRIBUTION: A MIXTURE PRIOR
J. B. S. Haldane was a true polymath; White (1965) called him “probably the
most erudite biologist of his generation, and perhaps of the [twentieth] century”
(as cited in Crow, 1992, p. 1). Perhaps best known for his pioneering work on
mathematical population genetics (alongside Ronald Fisher and Sewall Wright,
see Smith, 1992), Haldane is also recognized for making substantial contributions
to the fields of physiology, biochemistry, mathematics, cosmology, ethics, religion,
and (Marxist) philosophy.6 In addition to this already impressive list of topics,
in 1932 Haldane published a paper in which he presents his views regarding the
foundations of statistical inference (Haldane, 1932). At the time this was unusual
for Haldane, as most of his academic work before 1932 was primarily concerned
with physical sciences.
By 1931, Haldane had been working for twenty years developing a mathemat-
ically rigorous account of the chromosomal theory of genetic inheritance; this
work began in 1911 (at age 19) when, during a Zoology seminar at New College,
Oxford, he announced his discovery of genetic linkage in vertebrates (Haldane,
1966). This would become the basis of one of his most influential research lines,
to which he intermittently applied Bayesian analyses.7 Throughout his career,
Haldane would also go on to publish many papers pertaining to classical (non-
Bayesian) mathematical statistics, including a presentation of the exact moments
of the χ2 distribution (Haldane, 1937), a discussion of how to transform various
statistics so that they are approximately normally distributed (Haldane, 1938),
an exploration of the properties of inverse (i.e., negative) binomial sampling (Hal-
dane, 1945), a proposal for a two-sample rank test (Haldane and Smith, 1947),
and an investigation of the bias of maximum likelihood estimates (Haldane, 1951).
Despite his keen interest in mathematical statistics, Haldane’s work pertaining
to its foundations are confined to a single paper published in the early 1930s. So,
while unfortunate, it is perhaps understandable that the advances he made in
1931 are not widely known: This work is something of an anomaly, buried and
forgotten in his sizable corpus.
Haldane’s paper, “A note on inverse probability”, was received by the Mathe-
matical Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society on November 19, 1931
and read at the Society meeting on December 7, 1931 (Haldane, 1932). He begins
6Haldane (1966) provides an abridged autobiography, and Clark (1968) is a more thorough
biographical reference. For more details on the wide-reaching legacy of Haldane, see Crow (1992),
Lai (1998), and (Pirie, 1966). Haldane was also a prominent public figure during his time and
wrote many essays for the popular press (e.g., Haldane, 1927).
7In one such analysis, Haldane (1919) used Bayesian updating of a uniform prior (as was
customary in that time) to find the probable error of calculated linkage estimates (proportions).
It is unclear from where exactly Haldane learned inverse probability, but over the years he
occasionally made references to probabilistic concepts put forth by von Mises (e.g., the idea of
a “kollective” from Von Mises, 1931) or proofs for his formulas given by Todhunter (1865).
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Fig 1. John Burdon Sanderson (J. B. S.) Haldane (1892–1964) in 1941. (Photograph by Hans
Wild, LIFE Magazine)
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by stating his goal, “Bayes’ theorem is based on the assumption that all values of
the parameter in the neighbourhood of that observed are equally probable a pri-
ori. It is the purpose of this paper to examine what more reasonable assumption
may be made, and how it will affect the estimate based on the observed sample”
(p. 55). Haldane frames his paper as giving Fisher’s method of maximum like-
lihood a foundation through inverse probability (much to Fisher’s chagrin, see
Fisher, 1932). Haldane gives a short summary of his problem of interest (we will
repeatedly quote at length to provide complete context):
Let us first consider a population of which a proportion x possess the character X,
and of which a sample of n members is observed, n being so large that one of the
exponential approximations to the binomial probability distribution is valid. Let a
be the number of individuals in the sample which possess the character X. (p. 55)
The problem, in slightly archaic notation, is the typical binomial sampling setup.
Haldane goes on to say,
It is an important fact that in almost all scientific problems we have a rough idea
of the nature of f(x) [the prior distribution] derived from the past study of similar
populations. Thus, if we are considering the proportion of females in the human
population of any large area, f(x) is quite small unless x lies between .4 and .6. (p.
55)
Haldane appeals to availability of real scientific information to justify using non-
uniform prior distributions. It is stated as a fact that we have information indi-
cating that various regions for x are more probable than others. Haldane goes on
to derive familiar posteriors for x starting from a uniform prior (p. 55-56) before
discussing possible implications that deviations from uniform priors have on the
posteriors. His description of one such interesting deviation follows:
If [the slope of the prior probability density], though small compared with n1/2 in
the neighborhood of x = a/n, has an infinity or becomes very large for some other
value of x (other than 0 or 1), and if a/n is finite [i.e., a 6= 0 and n 6= ∞], then the
[posterior] probability distribution is approximately Gaussian in the neighborhood
of x = a/n, but has an infinity or secondary maximum at the other point or points.
(p. 56-57)
In other words, when a prior distribution has a distinct mass of probability at
some point between 0 and 1, and a large binomial sample is obtained that contains
some a’s and some not-a’s, the posterior distribution can be approximated by a
Gaussian except for a separate infinity.
Haldane avoids the trouble of an infinite density in the prior8 by marginalizing
across two orthogonal models to obtain a single mixture prior distribution that
consists of a point hypothesis and a smoothly distributed alternative. Haldane
first clarifies with an example and then solves the problem. We quote at length:
An illustration from genetics will make the point clear. The plant Primula sinensis
possesses twelve pairs of chromosomes of approximately equal size. A pair of genes
selected at random will lie on different chromosomes in 11/12 of all cases, giving
a proportion x = .5 of “cross-overs.” In 1/12 of all cases they lie on the same
chromosome, the values of the cross-over ratio x ranging from 0 to .5 without any
very marked preference for any part of this range, except perhaps for a tendency to
avoid values very close to .5. f(x) is thus approximately 1/6 for 0 ≤ x <.5; it has
a discontinuity at x = .5, such that the probability is 11/12; while, for .5 < x ≤ 1,
f(x) = 0.
8Incidentally, Jeffreys is struggling to solve a similar problem of infinite densities in a prior
distribution around this time (see Jeffreys, 1931, pp. 194-195).
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Now if a family of 400 seedlings from the cross between [two plants] contains
160 “cross-overs” we have two alternatives. The probability of getting such a family
from a plant in which the genes lie in different chromosomes is 11/12 400C160 2
−400,
or 1.185× 10−5. The probability of getting it from a plant in which they lie in the
same chromosome is
1
6
400C160
∫ .5
0
x160(1− x)240dx.
Since this integral is very nearly equal to∫ 1
0
x160(1− x)240dx, or 160! 240!
401!
,
this probability is approximately
1
6× 401 , or 4.56×10
−4. Thus the probability that
the family is derived from a plant where the genes lie in different chromosomes and
x = .5 is .028. Otherwise the mean value of x is .4, with standard error .0245. The
overall mean value, or mathematical expectation, of x is .4028, and the graph of
the [posterior probability density] is an approximately normal error curve centred
at x = .4 with standard deviation .0245, together with an infinity at x = .5. (p. 57)
Haldane’s passage may be hard to parse since the example is somewhat opaque
and the notation is dated. However, the passage is crucial and therefore we un-
pack Haldane’s problem as follows. When Haldane speaks of “pairs of genes” he
means that there are two different genes that are responsible for different traits,
such as genes for stem length and leaf color in Primula sinensis. Since the DNA
code for particular genes are located in specific parts of specific chromosomes,
during reproduction they can randomly have their alleles switch from mother
chromosome to father chromosome, which is called “cross-over.” We are cross-
breeding plants and we want to know the cross-over rate for these genes, which
depends on whether the pair of genes are on the same of different chromosomes.
For example, if the gene for petal color and the gene for stem length are in differ-
ent chromosomes, then they would cross-over independently in their respective
chromosomes during cell division, and the children should show new mixtures
of color and length at a certain rate (50% in Haldane’s example). If they are in
the same chromosome it is possible for the two genes to be located in the same
segment of the chromosome that crosses over, and because their expression varies
together they will show less variety in trait combination on average (i.e., < 50%).
Haldane’s example uses this fact to go backwards, from the number of “cross-
overs” present in the child plants to infer the chromosomal distance between
the genes. We will use θ, rather than Haldane’s x, to denote the cross-over rate
parameter. If the different genes lie on different chromosomes they cross-over
independently during meiosis, and so there is a 50% probability to see new com-
binations of these traits for any given offspring. Hence if traits are on different
chromosomes then θ = .5. If they lie on the same chromosome they have a cross-
over rate of θ < .5, where the percentage varies based on their relative location on
the chromosome. If they are relatively close together on the chromosome they are
likely to cross-over together and we won’t see many offspring with new combina-
tions of traits, so the cross-over rate will be closer to θ = 0. If they are relatively
far apart on the chromosome they are less likely to cross-over together, so they
will have a cross-over rate closer to θ = .5.
Since there are 12 pairs of chromosomes, there is a natural prior probability
assignment for the two competing models: 11/12 pairs of genes selected at random
will lie on different chromosomes (M0) and 1/12 will lie on the same chromosome
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(M1); when they are on the same chromosome they could be anywhere on the
chromosome, so the distance between them can range from nearly nil to nearly
an entire chromosome. To capture this information Haldane uses a uniform prior
from 0 to .5 for θ. When they are on different chromosomes, θ = .5 precisely.
Hence Haldane’s mixture prior comprises the prior distributions for θ from the
two models,
pi0(θ) = δ(.5)
pi1(θ) = U(0, .5),
where δ(·) denotes the Dirac delta function, and with prior probabilities (i.e.,
mixing weights) for the two models of P (M0) = 11/12 and P (M1) = 1/12. The
marginal prior density for θ can be written as
pi(θ) = P (M0)pi0(θ) + P (M1)pi1(θ)
=
11
12
× δ(.5) + 1
12
× U(0, .5),
using the law of total probability. Haldane is left with a mixture of a point mass
and a smooth probability density.
Haldane breeds his plants and obtains n = 400 offspring, a = 160 of which are
cross-overs (an event we denote D). The probability of the data, 160 cross-overs
out of 400, under M0 (now known as the marginal likelihood) is
P (D | M0) =
(
400
160
)
(.5)400.
The probability of the data under M1 is
P (D | M1) = 2
(
400
160
)∫ .5
0
θ160(1− θ)240 dθ.
The probabilities of the data can be used in conjunction with the prior model
probabilities to update the prior mixing weights to posterior mixing weights (i.e.,
posterior model probabilities) by applying Bayes’ theorem as follows (for i = 0, 1):
P (Mi | D) = P (Mi)P (D | Mi)
P (M1)P (D | M1) + P (M0)P (D | M0) .
Using the information found thus far, the posterior model probabilities are P (M1 |
D) = .972 and P (M0 | D) = .028. The two conditional prior distributions for
θ are also updated to conditional posterior distributions using Bayes’ theorem.
Under M0 the prior distribution is a Dirac delta function at θ = .5, which is
unchanged by the data. UnderM1, the prior distribution U(0, .5) is updated to a
posterior distribution that is approximatelyN (.4, .02452). The marginal posterior
density for θ can thus be written as a mixture,
pi(θ | D) = P (M0 | D)pi0(θ | D) + P (M1 | D)pi1(θ | D)
= .028× δ(.5) + .972×N (.4, .02452).
Moreover, Haldane then uses the law of total probability to arrive at a model-
averaged prediction for θ, as follows: E(θ) = .5× .028 + 160400 × .972 = .4028. This
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appears to be the first concrete application of Bayesian model averaging (Hoeting
et al., 1999).9
Haldane uses a mixture prior distribution to solve another challenging prob-
lem.10 We quote Haldane:
We now come to the case where a = 0. . . Unless we have reasons to the contrary, we
can no longer assume that x = 0 is an infinitely improbable solution. . . In the case
of many classes both of logical and physical objects we can point to a finite, though
undeterminable, probability that x = 0. Thus there are good, but inconclusive,
reasons for the beliefs that there is no even number greater than 2 that cannot
be expressed as the sum of 2 primes, and that no hydrogen atoms have an atomic
weight between 1.9 and 2.1. In addition, we know of very large samples of each
containing no members possessing these properties. Let us suppose then, that k is
the a priori probability that x = 0, and that the a priori probability that it has
a positive [nonzero] value is expressed by f(x), where Lt
→0
∫ 1

f(x)dx = 1 − k. (p.
58-59)
There is an explicit (albeit data-driven, by the sound of it) interest in a special
value of the parameter, but under a continuous prior distribution the probability
of any point is zero. To solve this problem, Haldane again uses a mixture prior; in
modern notation, k denotes the prior probability P (M0) of the point-mass com-
ponent of the mixture, a Dirac delta function at θ = 0, with a second component
that is a continuous function of θ with prior probability P (M1) = 1− k.
In a straightforward application of Bayes’ theorem, Haldane finds that “the
probability, after observing the sample, that x = 0 is
k
k +
∫ 1
0 (1− x)nf(x)dx
.
“If f(x) is constant this is (n + 1)k/(nk + 1). . . This is so even if f(x) has a
logarithmic infinity at x = 0... Hence as n tends to infinity the probability that
x = 0 tends to unity, however small be the value of k.” (Haldane, 1932, p.
59). Haldane again goes on to perform Bayesian model-averaging to find “the
probability that the next individual observed will have the character X” (p. 59).
In sum, in 1931 Haldane presents his views on the foundations of statistical
inference, and proposed to use a two-component mixture prior comprising a point
mass and smoothly distributed alternative. He went on to apply this mixture prior
to concrete problems involving genetic linkage, and in doing so also performed
the first instances of Bayesian model-averaging. To assess the importance and
originality of Haldane’s contribution it is essential to discuss the related earlier
work of Wrinch and Jeffreys, and the later work by Jeffreys alone.
9Robert et al. (2009, p. 166) point out that Jeffreys’s Theory of Probability (Jeffreys, 1939)
“includes the seeds” of model averaging. In fact, the seeds appear to go back to Wrinch and
Jeffreys (1921, p. 387), where they briefly note that if future observation q2 is implied by law p
(i.e., P (q2 | q1, p) = 1), “the probability of a further inference from the law is not appreciably
higher than that of the law itself” since the second term in the sum P (q2 | q1) = P (p | q1)P (q2 |
q1, p) + P (∼ p | q1)P (q2 | q1,∼ p) is usually “the product of two small factors” (p. 387).
10The way Haldane (1932) sets up the problem shows a great concurrence of thought with
Jeffreys, who was tackling a similar problem at the time in his book Scientific Inference (Jeffreys,
1931, p. 194-195).
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3. WRINCH AND JEFFREYS’S DEVELOPMENT OF THE BAYES
FACTOR BEFORE HALDANE (1932)
Jeffreys was interested in the philosophy of science and induction from the
beginning of his career. He learned of inverse probability at a young age (circa
1905, when he would have been 14 or 15 years old) from reading his father’s
copy of Todhunter (1858) (Exhibit H204, St John’s College Library, Papers of
Sir Harold Jeffreys). To Jeffreys, Toddhunter explained “inverse probability ab-
solutely clearly and I [Jeffreys] never saw there was any difficulty about it” (Tran-
scribed by AE from the audio-cassette in Exhibit H204, St John’s College Library,
Papers of Sir Harold Jeffreys). His views were refined around the year 1915 while
studying Karl Pearson’s influential Grammar of Science (Pearson, 1892), which
led Jeffreys to see inverse probability as the method that “seemed. . . the sensi-
ble way of expressing common sense” (“Transcription of a Conversation between
Sir Harold Jeffreys and Professor D.V. Lindley”, Exhibit A25, St John’s College
Library, Papers of Sir Harold Jeffreys). This became a theme that permeated
his early work, done in conjunction with Dorothy Wrinch, which sought to put
probability theory on a firm footing for use in scientific induction.11
Their work was motivated by that of Broad (1918), who showed12 that when
one applies Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason — assigning equal probability
to all possible states of nature — to finite populations, one is lead to an inductive
pathology: A general law could virtually never achieve a high probability. This
was a result that flew in the face of the common scientific view of the time that “an
inference drawn from a simple scientific law may have a very high probability, not
far from unity” (Wrinch and Jeffreys, 1921, p. 380). Jeffreys (1980) later recalled
Broad’s result,
Broad used Laplace’s theory of sampling, which supposes that if we have a popula-
tion of n members, r of which may have a property ϕ, and we do not know r, the
prior probability of any particular value of r (0 to n) is 1/(n+1). Broad showed that
on this assessment, if we take a sample of number m and find all of them with ϕ, the
posterior probability that all n are ϕ’s is (m+1)/(n+1). A general rule would never
acquire a high probability until nearly the whole of the class had been sampled.
We could never be reasonably sure that apple trees would always bear apples (if
anything). The result is preposterous, and started the work of Wrinch and myself in
1919–1923. (p. 452)
The consequence of Wrinch and Jeffreys’s series of papers was the derivation
of two key results. First, they found a solution to Broad’s quandary in the assign-
ment of a finite initial probability, independent of the population’s size, to the
11More background for the material in this section can be found in Aldrich (2005) and
Howie (2002). See Howie (2002, Chapter 4) and Senechal (2012, Chapter 8) for details on the
personal relationship between Wrinch and Jeffreys. Many of the ideas presented by Wrinch and
Jeffreys are similar in spirit to those of W. E. Johnson; as a student, Wrinch attended Johnson’s
early lectures on advanced logic at Cambridge (see Howie, 2002, p. 86). Jeffreys would later
emphasize Wrinch’s important contributions their work on scientific induction, “I should like to
put on record my appreciation of the substantial contribution she [Wrinch] made to this work
[(Wrinch and Jeffreys, 1919, 1921, 1923a,b)], which is the basis of all my later work on scientific
inference” (Hodgkin and Jeffreys, 1976, p. 564). See Senechal (2012) for more on Wrinch’s far-
reaching scientific influence.
12For an in-depth discussion about the law of succession, including Broad’s insights, see
Zabell (1989). Zabell points out that Broad’s result had been derived earlier by others, including
Prevost and LH`uilier (1799), Ostrogradski (1848), and Terrot (1853). Interested readers should
see Zabell (1989, p. 286, as well as the mathematical appendix beginning on p. 309).
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Fig 2. Dorothy Wrinch (1894–1976) circa 1920–1923. (Photograph by Sir Harold Jeffreys, in-
cluded by permission of the Master and Fellows of St John’s College, Cambridge)
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general law itself, which allows a general law to achieve a high probability with-
out needing to go so far as to sample nearly the entire population. Second, they
derived the odds form of Bayes’ theorem (Wrinch and Jeffreys, 1921, p. 387): “If
p denote the most probable law at any stage, and q an additional experimental
fact, [and h the knowledge we had before the experiment,]” (p. 386) a new form
of Bayes’ theorem can be written as
P (p | q.h)
P (∼ p | q.h) =
P (q | p.h)
P (q |∼ p.h) ·
P (p | h)
P (∼ p | h) .
At the time, the conception of Bayes’ rule in terms of odds was novel. Good
(1988) remarked, “[the above equation] has been mentioned several times in the
literature without citing Wrinch and Jeffreys. Because it is so important I think
proper credit should be given” (p. 390). We agree with Good; the importance of
this innovation should not be understated, because it lays the foundation for the
future of Bayesian hypothesis testing. A simple rearrangement of terms highlights
that the Bayes factor is the ratio of posterior odds to prior odds,
P (q | p, h)
P (q |∼ p, h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bayes factor
=
P (p | q, h)
P (∼ p | q, h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Posterior odds
/
P (p | h)
P (∼ p | h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prior odds
.
Wrinch and Jeffreys went on to show how the Bayes factor—which is the amount
by which the data, q, shift the balance of probabilities for p versus ∼ p—can form
the basis of a philosophy of scientific learning (Ly et al., 2016).
4. JEFFREYS’S DEVELOPMENT OF THE BAYES FACTOR AFTER
HALDANE (1932)
Remarkably, the Bayes factor remained a conceptual development until Jeffreys
published two seminal papers in 1935 and 1936. In 1935, Jeffreys published his
first significance tests in the Mathematical Proceedings of the Cambridge Philo-
sophical Society, with the title, “Some Tests of Significance, Treated by the The-
ory of Probability” (Jeffreys, 1935). This was shortly after his published dispute
with Fisher (for an account of the controversy see Aldrich, 2005; Howie, 2002;
Lane, 1980).
In his opening statement to the 1935 article, Jeffreys states his main goal:
It often happens that when two sets of data obtained by observation give slightly
different estimates of the true value we wish to know whether the difference is
significant. The usual procedure is to say that it is significant if it exceeds a certain
rather arbitrary multiple of the standard error; but this is not very satisfactory,
and it seems worth while to see whether any precise criterion can be obtained by a
thorough application of the theory of probability. (p. 203)
Jeffreys calls his procedures “significance tests” and surely means for this work
to contrast with that of Fisher’s. Even though Jeffreys does not mention Fisher
directly, Jeffreys does allude to their earlier dispute by reaffirming that his prob-
abilities express “no opinion about the frequency of the truth of [the hypothesis]
among any real or imaginary populations” (presumably addressing one of Fisher’s
1934 objections to Jeffreys’s solution to the theory of errors) and that assigning
equal probabilities to propositions “is simply the formal way of saying that we do
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Fig 3. Sir Harold Jeffreys (1891–1989) in 1928. (Photographer unknown, included by permission
of the Master and Fellows of St John’s College, Cambridge)
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not know whether it is true or not of the actual populations under consideration
at the moment” (Jeffreys, 1935, p. 203).
Jeffreys strives to use the theory of probability to find a satisfactory rule to
determine whether differences between observations should be considered “sig-
nificant,” and he begins with a novel approach to test a difference of proportions
as present in a contingency table. Jeffreys first posits the existence of two “large,
but not infinite, populations” and that these “have been sampled in respect to a
certain property” (Jeffreys, 1935, p. 203). He continues,13
One gives [x0] specimens with the property, [y0] without; the other gives [x1] and
[y1] respectively. The question is, whether the difference between [x0/y0] and [x1/y1]
gives any ground for inferring a difference between the corresponding ratios in the
complete populations. Let us suppose that in the first population the fraction of the
whole possessing the property is [θ0], in the second [θ1]. Then we are really being
asked whether [θ0 = θ1]; and further, if [θ0 = θ1], what is the posterior probability
distribution among values of [θ0]; but, if [θ0 6= θ1], what is the distribution among
values of [θ0] and [θ1]. (p. 203)
TakeM0 to represent the proposition that θ0 = θ1, so thatM1 represents θ0 6= θ1.
Jeffreys takes the prior probability of both M0 and M1 as .5. This problem can
be restated so that M0 represents the difference between θ0 and θ1, namely,
θ0 − θ1 = 0. This is Jeffreys’s point null hypothesis which is assigned a finite
prior probability of .5. If the null is true, and θ0 = θ1, then Jeffreys assigns θ0
a uniform prior distribution in the range 0 − 1. The remaining half of the prior
probability is assigned to M1, which specifies θ0 and θ1 have their probabilities
“uniformly and independently distributed” in the range 0− 1 (p. 204). Thus,
pi0(θ0) = U(0, 1)
pi1(θ0) = U(0, 1)
pi1(θ1) = U(0, 1)
and pi1(θ0, θ1) = pi1(θ0)pi1(θ1). Subsequently,
P (M0, θ0) = P (M0)pi0(θ0)
P (M1, θ0, θ1) = P (M1)pi1(θ0, θ1),
which follows from the product rule of probability, namely,
P (p, q) = P (p)P (q | p).
Jeffreys then derives the likelihood functions for D (i.e., the data, or com-
positions of the two samples) on the null and the alternative. Under the null
hypothesis, M0, the probability of D is
f(D | θ0,M0) = (x0 + y0)!
x0!y0!
(x1 + y1)!
x1!y1!
θx00 (1− θ0)y0 θx10 (1− θ0)y1 .
Under the alternative hypothesis, M1, the probability of D is
f(D | θ0, θ1,M1) = (x0 + y0)!
x0!y0!
(x1 + y1)!
x1!y1!
θx00 (1− θ0)y0 θx11 (1− θ1)y1 .
13To facilitate comparisons to Haldane’s section we have translated Jeffreys’s unconventional
notation to a more modern form. See Ly et al. (2016, appendix D) for details about translating
Jeffreys’s notation.
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In other words, the probability of both sets of data (x0+y0 and x1+y1), onM0 or
M1, is equal to the product of their respective binomial likelihood functions and
constants of proportionality. Since the prior distributions for θ0 and θ1 are uniform
and the prior probabilities of M0 and M1 are equal, the posterior distributions
of θ0 and (θ0, θ1) are proportional to their respective likelihood functions above.
Thus the posterior distributions for θ0 and (θ0, θ1) under the null and alternative
are, respectively,
pi0(θ0 | D) ∝ θx0+x10 (1− θ0)y0+y1 ,
and
pi1(θ0, θ1 | D) ∝ θx00 (1− θ0)y0 θx11 (1− θ1)y1 .
Now Jeffreys has two contending posterior distributions, and to find the posterior
probability of M1 he integrates P (M0, θ0 | D) with respect to θ0 and integrates
P (M1, θ0, θ1 | D) with respect to both θ0 and θ1. Using the identity
∫ 1
0 θ
x0
0 (1 −
θ0)
y0dθ0 = (x0!y0!)/(x0 + y0 + 1)!, he derives the relative posterior probabilities
of M0 and M1. For M0 it is simply the previous identity with the additional
terms of x1 and y1 added to the respective factorial terms,
P (M0 | D) ∝ (x0 + x1)!(y0 + y1)!
(x0 + x1 + y0 + y1 + 1)!
.
To obtain the posterior probability of M1, the product of the integrals with
respect to each of θ0 and θ1 is needed,
P (M1 | D) ∝ x0!y0!
(x0 + y0 + 1)!
x1!y1!
(x1 + y1 + 1)!
.
Their ratio gives the posterior odds, P (M0 | D)/P (M1 | D), and is the solution
to Jeffreys’s significance test. When this ratio is greater than 1, the data support
M0 over M1, and vice versa.
Jeffreys ends his paper with a discussion of the implications of his approach.14
One crucial point is that if the prior odds are different from unity then the
final calculations from Jeffreys’s tests yield the marginal likelihoods of the two
hypotheses, P (D | M0) and P (D | M1), whose ratio gives the Bayes factor. We
quote at length,
We have in each case considered the existence and the non-existence of a real dif-
ference between the two quantities estimated as two equivalent alternatives, each
with prior probability 1/2. This is a common case, but not general. If however the
prior probabilities are unequal the only difference is that the expression obtained for
[P (M0 | D)/P (M1 | D)] now represents
[
P (M0 | D)
P (M1 | D)
/
P (M0)
P (M1)
]
[NB: the Bayes
factor, which is the posterior odds divided by prior odds]. Thus if the estimated ra-
tio exceeds 1, the proposition [M0] is rendered more probable by the observations,
and if it is less than 1, [M0] is less probable than before. It still remains true that
there is a critical value of the observed difference, such that smaller values reduce
the probability of a real difference. The usual practice [NB: alluding to Fisher] is
to say that a difference becomes significant at some rather arbitrary multiple of the
standard error; the present method enables us to say what that value should be. If
however the difference examined is one that previous considerations make unlikely
to exist, then we are entitled to ask for a greater increase of the probability before
we accept it, and therefore for a larger ratio of the difference to its standard error.
(p. 221)
14In this paper Jeffreys gives many more derivations of new types of significance tests, but
one example suffices to convey the general principle.
HALDANE’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE BAYES FACTOR 17
Here Jeffreys has also laid out the benefits his tests possess over Fisher’s tests: The
critical standard error, where the ratio supportsM0, is not fixed at an arbitrary
value but is determined by the amount of data (Jeffreys, 1935, p. 205); in Jeffreys’s
test, larger sample sizes increase the critical standard error and thus increase the
barrier for ‘rejection’ at a given threshold (note that this anticipates Lindley’s
paradox, Lindley, 1957). Furthermore, if the phenomenon has unfavorable prior
odds against its existence we may reasonably require more evidence (i.e., a larger
Bayes factor) before we are reasonably confident in its existence. That is to say,
extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.
In a complementary paper, Jeffreys (1936a) expanded on the implications of
this method:
To put the matter in other words, if an observed difference is found to be on order
[of one standard error from the null], then on the hypothesis that there is no real
difference this is what would be expected; but if there was a real difference that
might have been anywhere within a range m it is a remarkable coincidence that it
should have happened to be in just this particular stretch near zero. On the other
hand if the observed difference is several times its standard error it is very unlikely
to have occurred if there was no real difference, but it is as likely as ever to have
occurred if there was a real difference. In this case beyond a certain value of x [a
distance from the null] the more remarkable coincidence is for the hypothesis of
no real difference . . . The theory merely develops these elementary considerations
quantitatively. . . (p. 417)
In sum, the key developments in Jeffreys’s significance tests are that a point
null is assigned finite prior probability and that this point null is tested against a
distributed (composite) alternative hypothesis. The posterior odds of the models
are computed from the data, with the updating factor now known as the Bayes
factor.
5. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN JEFFREYS AND HALDANE
We are now in a position to draw comparisons between the developments of
Haldane and Jeffreys. The methods show a striking similarity in that they both
set up competing models with orthogonal parameters, each with a finite prior
model probability, and through the calculation of each model’s marginal likeli-
hood find posterior model probabilities and posterior distributions for the pa-
rameters. Where the methods differ is primarily in the focus of their inference.
Haldane focuses on the overall mixture posterior distribution for the parameter,
pi(θ | D), marginalized across the competing models. In Haldane’s example, this
means to focus on estimating the cross-over rate parameter, using relevant real-
world knowledge of the problem to construct a mixture probability distribution.
It would have been but a short step for Haldane to find the ratio of the posterior
and prior model odds as Jeffreys did, since the prior and posterior model prob-
abilities are crucial in constructing the mixture distributions, but that aspect of
the problem was not Haldane’s primary interest.
Jeffreys’s focus is nearly the opposite of Haldane’s. Jeffreys uses the models to
instantiate competing scientific theories, and his focus is on making an inference
about which theory is more probable. In contrast to Haldane, Jeffreys isolates the
value of the Bayes factor as the basis of scientific learning and statistical inference,
and he takes the posterior distributions for the parameters within the models as
a mere secondary interest. If one does happen to be interested in estimating
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a parameter in the presence of model uncertainty, Jeffreys recognizes that one
should ideally form a mixture posterior distribution for the parameter (as Haldane
does), but that “nobody is likely to use it. In practice, for sheer convenience, we
shall work with a single hypothesis and choose the most probable” (Jeffreys, 1935,
p. 222).
Clearly there was a great concurrence of thought between Haldane and Jef-
freys during this time period. A natural question is whether the men knew of
each others’ work on the topic. In his paper, Haldane (1932) makes no reference
to any of Jeffreys’s previous works (recall, Haldane’s stated goal was to extend
Fisher’s method of maximum likelihood and discuss the use of non-uniform pri-
ors). Jeffreys’s first book, Scientific Inference (Jeffreys, 1931), came out a mere
eight months before Haldane submitted his paper, and it was not widely read by
Jeffreys’s contemporaries; around the time the revised first edition was released
in 1937, Jeffreys remarked to Fisher in a letter (on June 5, 1937) that he “should
really have liked to scrap the whole lot and do it again, but at the present rate it
looked as if the thing would take about 60 years to sell out” (Bennett, 1990, p.
164).15 So it would be no surprise if Haldane had not come across Jeffreys’s book.
In fact, had Haldane known of Scientific Inference, he would have surely recog-
nized that Jeffreys had given the same topics a thorough conceptual treatment.
For example, Haldane might have cited Wrinch and Jeffreys (1919), who detached
the theory of inverse probability from uniform distributions over a decade before;
or Haldane might have recognized the complete form of the Haldane prior pre-
sented by Jeffreys (1931, p. 194). Therefore, according to the evidence in the
literature, one might reasonably conclude that by 1931/1932, Haldane did not
know of Jeffreys’s work. What about Jeffreys, is there evidence in the literature
that he knew of Haldane’s work while working on his significance tests?
According to Jeffreys (1977), in the footnote in a piece looking back on his
career, he did recognize the similarity of his work to Haldane’s:
The essential point [in solving Broad’s quandary] is that when we consider a general
law we are supposing that it may possibly be true, and we express this by concen-
trating a positive (non-zero) fraction of the initial probability in it. Before my work
on significance tests the point had been made by J. B. S. Haldane (1932). (p. 95)
Jeffreys also acknowledges Haldane in a footnote of his first edition of Theory of
Probability (1939, retained in subsequent editions) when he remarks, “This paper
[(Haldane, 1932)] contained the use of . . . the concentration of a finite fraction
of the prior probability in a particular value, which later became the basis of my
significance tests”[emphasis added] (p. 114, footnote). So it is clear that Jeffreys,
at least some time later, recognized the similarity of his and Haldane’s thinking.
Jeffreys’s awareness of Haldane’s work must go back even further. Jeffreys cer-
tainly knew of Haldane’s work by 1932, because he wrote a critical commentary
on Haldane’s paper (which Jeffreys read at The Cambridge Philosophical Society
on November 7, 1932), pointing out, inter alia, that Haldane’s proposed prior
distribution largely “agrees with a previous guess” of his, but only after a slight
correction to its form (Jeffreys, 1933, p. 85).16 However, when publishing his
15Indeed, whereas 224 copies were sold in Great Britain and Ireland in 1931, only twenty
copies in total were sold in 1932, sixty-nine in 1933, thirty-five in 1934, fourteen in 1935, and
twenty-two in 1936 (Exhibits D399-400, St John’s College Library, Papers of Sir Harold Jeffreys).
16See Howie (2002, p. 121–126) for more detail on the reactions to Haldane’s paper by both
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seminal significance test papers in 1935 and 1936 (Jeffreys, 1935, 1936a), Jeffreys
does not mention Haldane’s work. It may appear to a reader of those papers as
if Jeffreys’s tests are entirely his own invention; indeed, they are the natural way
to apply his early work with Wrinch on the philosophy of induction to quantita-
tive tests of general laws. Perhaps Jeffreys simply forgot, or did not realize the
significance of Haldane’s paper on his own thinking at the time. But in another
paper published at that time, Jeffreys (1936b), in pointing out how he and Wrinch
solved Broad’s quandary, remarked,
but we [Wrinch and Jeffreys] pointed out that agreement with general belief is
obtained if we take the prior probability of a simple law to be finite, whereas on
the natural extension of the previous theory it is infinitesimal. Similarly for the
case of sampling J. B. S. Haldane and I have pointed out that general laws can
be established with reasonable probabilities if their prior probabilities are moderate
and independent of the whole number of members of the class sampled. (p. 344)
So it seems that Jeffreys did recognize the importance and similarity of Haldane’s
work in the very same years he was publishing his own work on significance tests
(1935–1936). Why Jeffreys did not cite Haldane’s work directly in connection
with his own development of significance tests is not clear just from looking at
the literature. There is, however, some potential clarity to be gained by examining
the personal relationship between the two men.
Haldane and Jeffreys were both in Cambridge from 1922-1932 while working
on these problems (Haldane at Trinity College and Jeffreys at St. John’s), after
which Haldane left for University College London. In an (unpublished) interview
with George Barnard (recall we quoted Barnard above as being one of the few to
recognize Haldane’s innovative “lump” of prior probability), after Jeffreys (HJ)
denies having known Fisher while they were both at Cambridge, Barnard (GB)
asks,
GB: But Haldane was in Cambridge, was he?
HJ: Yes.
GB: Because he joined in a bit I think in some of the . . . [NB: interrupted]
HJ: Yes, well Haldane did anticipate some things of mine. I have a reference to him
somewhere.
GB: But the contact was via the papers [NB: Haldane, 1932; Jeffreys, 1933] rather
than direct personal contact.
HJ: Well I knew Haldane, of course. Very well.
GB: Oh, ah.
HJ: Can you imagine him being in India?
(Transcribed by AE from the audio-cassette in Exhibit H204, St John’s College
Library, Papers of Sir Harold Jeffreys)
So it would seem that Jeffreys and Haldane knew each other personally very
well in their time at Cambridge. We cannot be sure of the extent to which they
knew of each others’ professional work at that time, because we can find no
surviving direct correspondence between Jeffreys and Haldane during the 1920s
to early 1930s; we are unable to do more than speculate about what topics they
might have discussed in their time together at Cambridge. However, there is some
preserved correspondence from the 1940s where they discuss, among other topics,
materialist versus realist philosophy, scientific inference, geophysics, and Marxist
politics.17 It stands to reason that Haldane and Jeffreys would have discussed
Jeffreys and Fisher; Fisher (1932) was particularly pointed in his commentary.
17This correspondence is available online thanks to the UCL Wellcome Library: http://goo.
gl/9qHBF6. Interestingly, near the end of this correspondence (undated, but from some time
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similar topics in their time together at Cambridge.
This personal relationship opens up the possibility that Jeffreys and Haldane
discussed their work in detail and consciously chose not to cite each other in
their published works in the 1930s. Perhaps Haldane brought up the genetics
problems he was working on and Jeffreys suggested the idea to Haldane to set
up orthogonal models as he did, an application which Jeffreys thought of but
had not yet published on. Haldane goes on to publish his paper, and both men,
realizing the question of credit is somewhat murky, decide to ignore the matter.
This would explain why Haldane never references these developments later in
his career. Admittedly, this account leaves a few points unresolved. It does not
appear that Haldane used this method in any of his later empirical investigations;
if Haldane and Jeffreys together developed this method in order to apply it to
one of Haldane’s genetics problems, why did Haldane never go on to actually
apply it? And if Jeffreys had thought of how to apply this revolutionary method
of inference, why was it not included in his book? Under this account, Jeffreys
would have had to think of this development in the few months between when he
wrote and published Scientific Inference and when Haldane began to write his
paper. Moreover, in his interview with Barnard and in his later published works,
Jeffreys readily notes that Haldane anticipated some of his own ideas (although,
it is not always entirely clear to which ideas Jeffreys refers). Did Jeffreys begin to
feel guilty that he would be getting credit for ideas that Haldane helped develop?
Today one might be surprised to hear that two people could become good
friends while potentially never discussing their work with each other; however, Jef-
freys has a history of remaining unaware of his close probabilist contemporaries’
work. It is well-known that Jeffreys and fellow Cambridge probabilist Frank Ram-
sey were good friends while at Cambridge and they never discussed their work
with each other either. Ramsey was highly regarded in Cambridge at the time,
and as Jeffreys recalls in his interview with Lindley, “I knew Frank Ramsey well
and visited him in his last illness but somehow or other neither of us knew that
the other was working on probability theory” (“Transcription of a Conversation
between Sir Harold Jeffreys and Professor D.V. Lindley”, Exhibit A25, St John’s
College Library, Papers of Sir Harold Jeffreys).18 When one realizes that the
friendship between Jeffreys and Ramsey began with their shared interest in psy-
choanalysis (Howie, 2002, p. 117), perhaps it makes sense that they would not get
around to discussing their work on such an obscure topic as probability theory.
6. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Around 1920, Dorothy Wrinch and Harold Jeffreys were the first to note that in
order for induction to be possible it is essential that general laws must be assigned
finite initial probability. This argument was revolutionary in that it went against
their contemporaries’ blind adherence to Laplace’s principle of indifference. It is
between 2 October 1942 and 29 March 1943) Haldane says to Jeffreys that he felt “emboldened
by your [Jeffreys’s] kindness to my views on inverse probability.”
18Jeffreys was also unaware of the work of Italian probabilist Bruno de Finetti, another of
his contemporary probabilists. In their interview, Lindley asks Jeffreys if he and de Finetti ever
made contact. Jeffreys replies that, not only had he and de Finetti never been in contact, “I’ve
only just heard his name... I’ve never seen anything that he’s done... I’m afraid I’ve just never
come across him” (“Transcription of a Conversation between Sir Harold Jeffreys and Professor
D.V. Lindley”, Exhibit A25, St John’s College Library, Papers of Sir Harold Jeffreys).
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this brilliant insight of Wrinch and Jeffreys that forms the conceptual basis of
the Bayes factor. Later Jeffreys would develop concrete Bayes factors in order to
test a point null against a smoothly distributed alternative to evaluate whether
the data justify changing the form of a general law. For these reasons, we believe
that Wrinch and Jeffreys should together be credited as the progenitors of the
concept of the Bayes factor, with Jeffreys the first to put the Bayes factor to use
in real problems of inference.
However, our historical review suggests that in 1931 J. B. S. Haldane made
an important intellectual advancement in the development of the Bayes factor.
We speculate that it was the specific nature of the linkage problem in genetics
that caused Haldane to serendipitously adopt a mixture prior comprising a point
mass and smooth distribution; it does not appear as if Haldane derived his result
from a principled philosophical stance on induction, in contrast to Jeffreys, but
merely through a pragmatic attempt at utilizing non-standard (i.e., non-uniform)
distributions with inverse probability. And yet, Haldane never went on to employ
this method to any of his future applications, so we cannot discount the possibility
that he was simply momentarily inspired to address the foundations of statistical
inference—as a polymath is wont to do. Then, having lost interest, he never
follows up on this work, thereby dooming his important development to obscurity.
We may never know his true motivations. Nevertheless, Haldane’s work likely
formed the impetus for Jeffreys to make his conceptual ideas concrete, leading to
his thorough development of Bayes factors in the following years.
The personal relationship between Haldane and Jeffreys further complicates
the story behind these developments. The two men were in close contact during
the period when they developed their ideas, and the extent to which they knew
of each other’s work on essentially the same problem is unclear. Haldane and
Jeffreys had closely converging ideas, as is seen by the similarity of their work in
the 1930s, and both were statistical pioneers whose influence is still felt today.
We hope this historical investigation will bring Haldane some well-deserved credit
for his impact on the development of the Bayes factor.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We are especially grateful to Kathryn McKee for helping us access the material
in the Papers of Sir Harold Jeffreys special collection at the St John’s College
Library; the quoted material is included by permission of the Master and Fel-
lows of St John’s College, Cambridge. We would like to thank Anthony (A. W.
F.) Edwards for keeping our Bernoullis straight, as well as looking up lecture
lists from the 1930s to check on Turing and Jeffreys’s potential interactions. We
would like to thank Christian Robert and Stephen Stigler for helpful comments
and suggested references. We also thank Alexander Ly for critical comments on
an early draft and for fruitful discussions about the philosophy of Sir Harold
Jeffreys. The first author (AE) is grateful to Rogier Kievit and Anne-Laura Van
Harmelen for their hospitality during his visit to Cambridge. Finally, we thank
the anonymous reviewers and editor for valuable comments and criticism. This
work was supported by the ERC grant “Bayes or Bust” and the National Science
Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship Program #DGE-1321846.
22 ETZ AND WAGENMAKERS
REFERENCES
Aldrich, J. (2005). “The Statistical Education of Harold Jeffreys.” International Statistical
Review / Revue Internationale de Statistique, 73(3): 289–307.
Banks, D. L. (1996). “A conversation with IJ Good.” Statistical Science, 1–19.
Barnard, G. A. (1967). “The Bayesian Controversy in Statistical Inference.” Journal of the
Institute of Actuaries, 93(2): 229–269.
Bayarri, M. J., Berger, J. O., Forte, A., and Garc´ıa-Donato, G. (2012). “Criteria for Bayesian
Model Choice With Application to Variable Selection.” The Annals of Statistics, 40: 1550–
1577.
Bennett, J. H. (1990). Statistical Inference and Analysis: Selected Correspondence of R.A.
Fisher . Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Berger, J. O. (2006). “Bayes Factors.” In Kotz, S., Balakrishnan, N., Read, C., Vidakovic,
B., and Johnson, N. L. (eds.), Encyclopedia of Statistical Sciences, vol. 1 (2nd ed.), 378–386.
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
Broad, C. D. (1918). “On the Relation between Induction and Probability (Part I.).” Mind ,
27(108): 389–404.
Clark, R. W. (1968). JBS: The Life and Work of J. B. S. Haldane. New York: Coward-McCann,
Inc.
Crow, J. F. (1992). “Centennial: JBS Haldane, 1892-1964.” Genetics, 130(1): 1.
Cuthill, J. H. and Charleston, M. (in press). “Wing Patterning Genes and Coevolution of
Mu¨llerian Mimicry in Heliconius Butterflies: Support from Phylogeography, Co-phylogeny
and Divergence Times.” Evolution.
Dienes, Z. (2014). “Using Bayes to Get the Most out of Non-Significant Results.” Frontiers in
Psycholology , 5:781.
Edwards, A. W. (1974). “The history of likelihood.” International Statistical Review/Revue
Internationale de Statistique, 9–15.
Fienberg, S. E. (2006). “When did Bayesian Inference Become “Bayesian”?” Bayesian Analysis,
1: 1–41.
Fisher, R. A. (1932). “Inverse Probability and the use of Likelihood.” Mathematical Proceedings
of the Cambridge Philosophical Society , 28(3): 257–261.
— (1934). “Probability Likelihood and Quantity of Information in the Logic of Uncertain
Inference.” Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series A, Containing Papers of a
Mathematical and Physical Character , 146(856): 1–8.
Fouskakis, D., Ntzoufras, I., and Draper, D. (2015). “Power-Expected-Posterior Priors for Vari-
able Selection in Gaussian Linear Models.” Bayesian Analysis, 10: 75–107.
Good, I. J. (1958). “Significance tests in parallel and in series.” Journal of the American
Statistical Association, 53(284): 799–813.
— (1979). “Studies in the History of Probability and Statistics. XXXVII A. M. Turing’s Sta-
tistical Work in World War II.” Biometrika, 66: 393–396.
— (1980). “The Contributions of Jeffreys to Bayesian Statistics.” In Zellner, A. (ed.), Bayesian
Analysis in Econometrics and Statistics: Essays in Honor of Harold Jeffreys, 21–34. Amster-
dam, The Netherlands: North-Holland Publishing Company.
— (1988). “The Interface between Statistics and Philosophy of Science.” Statistical Science,
3(4): 386–412.
Haldane, J. (1937). “The exact value of the moments of the distribution of χ 2, used as a test
of goodness of fit, when expectations are small.” Biometrika, 29(1/2): 133–143.
Haldane, J. B. S. (1919). “The probable errors of calculated linkage values, and the most
accurate method of determining gametic from certain zygotic series.” Journal of Genetics,
8(4): 291–297.
— (1927). Possible worlds: And other essays, volume 52. Chatto & Windus.
— (1932). “A Note on Inverse Probability.” Mathematical Proceedings of the Cambridge Philo-
sophical Society , 28: 55–61.
— (1938). “The approximate normalization of a class of frequency distributions.” Biometrika,
29(3/4): 392–404.
— (1945). “On a Method of Estimating Frequencies.” Biometrika, 33: 222–225.
— (1948). “The Precision of Observed Values of Small Frequencies.” Biometrika, 35: 297–300.
— (1951). “A class of efficient estimates of a parameter.” Bulletin of the International Statistics
Institute, 33: 231.
— (1966). “An autobiography in brief.” Perspectives in biology and medicine, 9(4): 476–481.
HALDANE’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE BAYES FACTOR 23
Haldane, J. B. S. and Smith, C. A. B. (1947). “A simple exact test for birth-order effect.”
Annals of Eugenics, 14(1): 117–124.
Hodgkin, D. C. and Jeffreys, H. (1976). “Obituary.” Nature, 260(5551).
Hoeting, J. A., Madigan, D., Raftery, A. E., and Volinsky, C. T. (1999). “Bayesian Model
Averaging: A Tutorial.” Statistical Science, 14: 382–417.
Holmes, C. C., Caron, F., Griffin, J. E., and Stephens, D. A. (2015). “Two-sample Bayesian
Nonparametric Hypothesis Testing.” Bayesian Analysis, 10: 297–320.
Howie, D. (2002). Interpreting Probability: Controversies and Developments in the Early Twen-
tieth Century . Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Jeffreys, H. (1931). Scientific Inference. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1 edition.
— (1933). “On the Prior Probability in the Theory of Sampling.” Mathematical Proceedings of
the Cambridge Philosophy Society , 29(1): 83–87.
— (1935). “Some Tests of Significance, Treated by the Theory of Probability.” Mathematical
Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophy Society , 31: 203–222.
— (1936a). “Further Significance Tests.” Mathematical Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophy
Society , 32: 416–445.
— (1936b). “XXVIII. On Some Criticisms of the Theory of Probability.” The London, Edin-
burgh, and Dublin Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science, 22(146): 337–359.
— (1939). Theory of Probability . Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1 edition.
— (1977). “Probability Theory in Geophysics.” IMA Journal of Applied Mathematics, 19:
87–96.
— (1980). “Some General Points in Probability Theory.” In Zellner, A. (ed.), Bayesian Analysis
in Econometrics and Statistics: Essays in Honor of Harold Jeffreys, 451–453. Amsterdam,
The Netherlands: North-Holland Publishing Company.
Kass, R. E. (2009). “Comment: The Importance of Jeffreys???s Legacy.” Statistical Science,
24(2): 179–182.
Kass, R. E. and Raftery, A. E. (1995). “Bayes Factors.” Journal of the American Statistical
Association, 90: 773–795.
Kendall, M. G., Bernoulli, D., Allen, C. G., and Euler, L. (1961). “Studies in the History of
Probability and Statistics: XI. Daniel Bernoulli on Maximum Likelihood.” Biometrika Trust ,
48(1/2).
Lai, D. C. (1998). “John Burdon Sanderson Haldane (1892-1964) Polymath Beneath the
Firedamp: The Story of JBS Haldane.” Bulletin of Anesthesia History , 16(3): 3–7.
Lambert, J. H. and DiLaura, D. L. (2001). Photometry, or, on the measure and gradations
of light, colors, and shade: translation from the Latin of photometria, sive, de mensura et
gradibus luminis, colorum et umbrae. Illuminating Engineering Society of North America.
Lane, D. A. (1980). “Fisher, Jeffreys and the Nature of Probability.” In Fienberg, S. E. and
Hinkley, D. V. (eds.), R.A. Fisher: An Appreciation, 148–160. New York: Springer.
Lattimer, J. M. and Steiner, A. W. (2014). “Neutron Star Masses And Radii From Quiescent
Low-Mass X-Ray Binaries.” The Astrophysical Journal , 784:123.
Lindley, D. V. (1957). “A Statistical Paradox.” Biometrika, 44: 187–192.
— (2009). “Comment.” Statistical Science, 24(2): 183–184.
Ly, A., Verhagen, A. J., and Wagenmakers, E.-J. (2016). “Harold Jeffreys’s Default Bayes
Factor Hypothesis Tests: Explanation, Extension, and Application in Psychology.” Journal
of Mathematical Psychology .
Malikov, E., Kumbhakar, S. C., and Tsionas, E. G. (2015). “Bayesian Approach to Disentangling
Technical and Environmental Productivity.” Econometrics, 3: 443–465.
Ostrogradski, M. V. (1848). “On a Problem Concerning Probabilities.” St. Petersburg Academic
of Sciences, 6: 321–346.
Pearson, K. (1892). The grammar of science, volume 17. Walter Scott.
Peirce, C. S. (1878). “The Probability of Induction.” Popular Science Monthly , 12: 705–718.
Pirie, N. W. (1966). “John Burdon Sanderson Haldane. 1892-1964.” Biographical Memoirs of
Fellows of the Royal Society , 12: 219–249.
Prevost, P. and LH`uilier, S. A. (1799). “Sur les probabilite´s.” Me´moires de l‘Academie Royale
de Berlin, 1796: 117–142.
Robert, C., Chopin, N., and Rousseau, J. (2009). “Harold Jeffreys‘s Theory of Probability
Revisited.” Statistical Science, 24: 141–172.
Robert, C. P. (2016). “The Expected Demise of the Bayes Factor.” Journal of Mathematical
Psychology .
24 ETZ AND WAGENMAKERS
Sarkar, S. (1992). “A centenary reassessment of JBS Haldane, 1892-1964.” BioScience, 42(10):
777–785.
Senechal, M. (2012). I Died for Beauty: Dorothy Wrinch and the Cultures of Science. Oxford
University Press.
Senn, S. (2009). “Comment on “Harold Jeffreys’s Theory of Probability Revisited”.” Statistical
Science, 24: 185–186.
Smith, J. M. (1992). “JBS Haldane.” In The Founders of Evolutionary Genetics, 37–51. Springer.
Sparks, D. K., Khare, K., and Ghosh, M. (2015). “Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for
High-Dimensional Posterior Consistency under g-Priors.” Bayesian Analysis, 10: 627–664.
Taroni, F., Marquis, R., Schmittbuhl, M., Biedermann, A., Thie´ry, A., and Bozza, S. (2014).
“Bayes Factor for Investigative Assessment of Selected Handwriting Features.” Forensic
Science International , 242: 266–273.
Terrot, C. (1853). “Summation of a Compound Series, and its Application to a Problem in
Probabilities.” Transactions of the Edinburgh Philosophical Society , 20: 541–545.
Todhunter, I. (1858). Algebra for the use of colleges and schools: with numerous examples.
Cambridge University Press.
— (1865). A History of the Mathematical Theory of Probability: From the Time of Pascal to
that of Laplace/by I. Todhunter . Macmillan and Company.
Turing, A. M. (1941/2012). “The Applications of Probability to Cryptography.” UK National
Archives, HW 25/37.
Von Mises, R. (1931). Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung und ihre anwendung in der statistik und
theorestischen physik . Franz Deuticke.
White, M. (1965). “JBS Haldane.” Genetics, 52(1): 1.
Wrinch, D. and Jeffreys, H. (1919). “On Some Aspects of the Theory of Probability.” Philo-
sophical Magazine, 38: 715–731.
— (1921). “On Certain Fundamental Principles of Scientific Inquiry.” Philosophical Magazine,
42: 369–390.
— (1923a). “On Certain Fundamental Principles of Scientific Inquiry (Second Paper.).” Philo-
sophical Magazine, 45: 368–374.
— (1923b). “The Theory of Mensuration.” Philosophical Magazine Series 6 , 46(271).
Zabell, S. (1989). “The Rule of Succession.” Erkenntnis, 31: 283–321.
— (2012). “Commentary on Alan M. Turing: The Applications of Probability to Cryptography.”
Cryptologia, 36: 191–214.
